Blocking Venezuela from UN Security Council

The drumbeat to try and deny Venezuela the rotating seat on the UN Security Council suffers from many logical deficiencies. I wrote about this before. It would be a terrible idea for the Obama administration to expend any political capital trying to accomplish it.

Why?

1. Latin America agreed in 2006 to take turns. It is Venezuela's turn. The U.S. would therefore have to assert publicly that Latin American agreements are null and void if it doesn't approve.

2. Given #1, the chances of success are slim to none. A failure for no reason hurts the U.S.

3. Given #1 and #2, success would require such massive maneuvering that the U.S. would find it harder to achieve more important goals (e.g. construction of international coalitions instead of unilateral action) later.

4. Having allies in that position doesn't necessarily work out well. Remember that Chile and Mexico blocked the Bush administration in 2003. The Bush administration's strongarm tactics backfired very badly.

5. Having adversaries in that position doesn't necessarily work out badly. Venezuela is replacing Argentina, which has never been friendly and is in a bitter dispute with U.S. courts but hasn't somehow used the Security Council for nefarious purposes.

If you support the effort to block Venezuela, you have to accept the fact that you advocate failing and losing influence for short-term symbolic reasons. That seems not to be a good use of political capital.

Samper Enters the Venezuela Fray

The crisis in Venezuela has become increasingly entangled with Colombian politics. While they were presidents, Hugo Chávez and Alvaro Uribe sniped at each other constantly. At a 2010 summit they even almost brawled, with Raúl Castro (of all people) calming things down. After leaving the presidency, Uribe has been on a Twitter rampage, often tying the FARC to the Venezuelan government and blaming Juan Manuel Santos. There is even a birther movement claiming Maduro was born in Colombia! More recently, the Venezuelan government constantly blames violence on the Colombian right.

Now there is a new twist. Former Colombian President Ernesto Samper is blaming the murder of Robert Serra on Colombian paramilitaries. In other words, the accusations usually came from Venezuela, but not they're also coming from a Colombian. As you might guess, the Venezuelan press ate this up. Especially since Samper is the new Secretary-General of UNASUR and therefore has an international platform, this Venezuela-Colombia tangle will get more attention. Uribe has responded to Maduro, but I have not seen him respond to Samper. As it turns out, Samper has poked fun at Uribe for all this tweeting, so now may become the recipient of it.

Venezuela's Gold

It sounds almost medieval. People want a look at Venezuela's $15 billion in gold to provide assurance for investment. From B of A economist Francisco Rodriguez, who got to see it:

In a Sept. 23 note to clients, Rodriguez said the “rare” visit was “largely symbolic yet reassuring.” 

“It’s not that the majority of the people doubt that the gold is there,” he said over the telephone. “But it’s one of these things that linger, something that’s nagging you and makes you wonder: What if it’s not?”

This can easily be spun as conspiratorial. The crazed fascist right spreads rumors about whether there is in fact any gold. Yet Rodriguez is one of the people refuting Ricardo Huasmann's suggestion that Venezuela should default.

Oil prices are falling, economic reforms aren't happening, while perception of risk is increasing and so it's getting more expensive for Venezuela to borrow. Outside of the Venezuelan government, it seems harder and harder to find optimistic views of the economy (not even from the Center for Economic and Policy Research). The "glass half full" argument is just "with oil they won't default."

Venezuela Likely to Take Security Council Seat

It's quite possible that Venezuela will assume a two-year rotating seat on the UN Security Council. In 2006 Hugo Chávez tried as hard as he could to get it, but the U.S. helped push Guatemala, then accept Panama as a compromise (I blogged a lot about that circus as it happened). I disagree with this logic about why Venezuela is not being challenged this time around:

The action reflects a decade-long shift in the region away from the United States. Conservative leaders from Peru to El Salvador that in 2006 had no fear of picking a fight with Chavez have since been voted out of office. Even nations that differ with Venezuela’s policies, such as Chile and Colombia, want to avoid a confrontation that harkens back to the polarized politics of the Cold War, when meddling by Washington was frequent.

This is the pat answer of the day--Latin America is moving away from the U.S. That logic ignores the following:

1. After 2006, Latin American countries agreed to take turns. It is now Venezuela's turn. If that was the agreement, then that was the agreement.

Following that display of disunity, regional governments agreed in private to alternate representation in a certain order. Under those procedures, it’s now Venezuela’s turn.

2. The current president of the U.S. is Obama, not Bush. Obama is far less confrontational and in this case must go up against the fact that a regional agreement way back then put Venezuela in this position now.

3. There is no evidence that either Chile or Colombia base their foreign policy decisions on trying not to harken back to the Cold War.

BTW, I happened to see on Twitter that Boz was also writing a post, with similar logic. He makes an additional point worth considering:

Another important note left out of the AP report: Venezuela will be replacing Argentina. While Venezuela's rhetoric will probably be sharper, their voting won't be that far off from the seat's current occupant. As the shift from Argentina to Venezuela isn't shifting the balance of voting on the UNSC much, it shouldn't worry the US.

So this will not be some sudden shift.

One last thought: at least in this case Nicolás Maduro is showing more acumen than his mentor by remaining quiet and avoiding the heated public rhetoric. That strategy would have backfired.

Venezuela Default Headline

Bloomberg's headline "Venezuelan Default Suggested by Harvard Economist" is extraordinarily misleading. A much more accurate version would be "Maduro Foe Makes Fun of the Government." It's Ricardo Hausmann, who was Minister of Planning when Hugo Chávez tried to overthrow his government, and he ends the interview by saying that he would resign if he were Maduro. The headline suggests some objective professor with Harvard gravitas.

At least the article itself lays out a bit more than that--Hausmann's argument is that the government should default and use the funds to alleviate shortages, saying that to do otherwise is "moral bankruptcy." Another economist, Francisco Rodríguez argues that default doesn't get at the real problem:

“Venezuela has more than enough foreign currency earnings to both ensure an adequate supply of imports and meet its foreign obligations,” Rodriguez said in a Sept. 5 note to clients. “Current scarcity levels are caused not by the need to service on the country’s external debt but by the massive distortions to relative prices that have resulted from the country’s tight price and exchange controls. Resolving these relative price distortions, rather than defaulting, is the key to restoring Venezuela’s macroeconomic health.”

Debt might be a problem, then, but paying it off is not the source of consumer good scarcity. What you need is to tackle the economic incentives that encourage smuggling, hoarding, and producing (or, as the case might be, not producing).

Argentina: We're Not Venezuela!

So the Argentine legislature is debating a price fixing law, but the Fernández administration is trying to reassure everyone it won't be like Venezuela:

“The fact that there’s a law doesn’t mean it will be applied like it is in Venezuela or that the consequences will be like those of Venezuela,” Commerce Secretary Augusto Costa said in a telephone interview from Buenos Aires yesterday.

The Argentine government clearly does not want to be seen as copying Venezuela (despite the fact that Nicolás Maduro's son visited Argentina to talk all about it) which has harebrained schemes of fingerprinting and claims of conspiracies. Still, inflation is 38% (at least by one measure--this is a constant matter of debate) and the government figures they can attack prices. Good luck with that!

In my Latin American politics class, I bring up the idea of incentives very early on. Prices are obviously a problem, but the core issue revolves around the incentives that government policies generate which drive prices up in the first place. Fighting prices per se is mostly attacking symptoms rather than disease. For example, currently farmers have an incentive to hoard soybeans priced in dollars because selling them and getting pesos is too risky.

Venezuelans' Views of the United States

According to the Pew Research Center, in the aggregate Venezuelans have a favorable view of the United States and are not so favorable toward Cuba. As you might guess, ideology explains a lot:

This goes along with other studies showing how currently the United States is seen quite favorably across the region. It also shows the skepticism moderates in Venezuela have about Cuba's role in the country.

Venezuela and CITGO

Bloomberg takes a highly critical look at Venezuela's efforts to sell CITGO, arguing it is yet another sign of financial problems. But this is what caught my eye:

An official for the state oil producer known as PDVSA, who asked not to be identified because he isn’t authorized to speak publicly, declined to comment on the potential divestment of the company’s Citgo assets.

So a PDVSA official isn't authorized even to say that he or she won't comment.

Fidel, Maduro, and Health Care

Nicolás Maduro came to visit Fidel Castro, who then wrote about the meeting in Granma. He dedicated a big chunk of it to Gaza, which included one particularly interesting discussion about Venezuela is sending equipment. I am trying to decide whether I am misunderstanding it.

Desde entonces los valientes pilotos venezolanos transportan su carga salvadora, que permite salvar madres, niños y adultos de la muerte. Leía hoy sin embargo un despacho de la agencia AP procedente de Venezuela, en el que se publican declaraciones de la “Asociación de Clínicas y Hospitales de Venezuela, que agrupa” a “centros de salud privados del país”, pidiendo al Gobierno que se declare una “emergencia humanitaria” para hacer frente a la “escasez de insumos, medicamentos, equipos médicos y repuestos” que, aseguran, “ponen en riesgo la vida de la población.” 

¡Qué enorme casualidad! Esta demanda se realiza precisamente cuando en la Franja de Gaza se produce el genocidio yanki-israelita de la zona más pobre y superpoblada de esa comunidad que ha vivido allí a lo largo de milenios.

Eso es lo que hace tan meritoria la conducta de Maduro y los militares y especialistas venezolanos que llevan a cabo tan ejemplar conducta ante la tragedia del pueblo hermano de Palestina. 

I am just trying to get the logic here. Fidel is referring to this AP story, which focuses on the serious shortages of medical supplies in Venezuela. The story focuses on private clinics. That, he says, coincides with shortages in Gaza, which is being attacked by Israel, backed by the United States. This, he concludes, shows how wonderful Maduro's efforts are to help out Palestinians.

My immediate reaction was that Fidel was saying that Palestinians deserved Venezuelan medicine more than Venezuelans who choose to go to private clinics. I guess because he assumes Venezuelans who go to private clinics are wealthier and therefore fascists who should be ignored?

Rory Carroll's Comandante: Hugo Chávez's Venezuela

I read Rory Carroll's Comandante: Hugo Chávez's Venezuela (2013) and enjoyed it. Carroll is a well-known journalist who reported from Venezuela for the Guardian from 2006-2012, and disliked by the left. Basically, if you think Venezuela is a thriving laboratory of revolution, you will hate the book. If you feel that Venezuela has tremendous promise that Hugo Chávez failed to harness, you will find it well-written and interesting, particularly because of his interviews. If you follow Venezuelan politics, it won't be new but you get a little deeper.

The book consists of vignettes with his interviews, which then serve to frame his larger point of a well-meaning revolution ripped apart by personalization of power, palace intrigue, and old fashioned cronyism. Carroll shows why Chávez was (and is) so beloved, the problems of personalization, and how utterly incompetent the opposition has been. Even the coup mongers screwed up. As one person who supported the 2002 coup put it, describing Pedro Carmona: "We won, or thought we had won. But then we made a terrible mistake. We picked that fucking dwarf" (p. 79). That encapsulates the basic sentiments of the radical opposition--failure to understand why Chávez was popular, or how even to attract support. Angry but clueless.

Carroll denies that Chávez was a dictator, and comes up with a counter-argument, namely that Chávez was so concerned about elections that he neglected details. Aló Presidente gave him a platform for votes but he didn't follow up. Lots of talking, no walking. He needed to win so badly that substance faded out while crime, insecurity, shortages, etc. soared. Those issues become the backdrop to judging the long-term success of the revolution.

Venezuela Conspiracy Theories

I'm quoted in this Associated Press article on the Venezuelan government's conspiracy theories. What I was trying to get at was that Nicolás Maduro uses domestic conspiracies a lot more than Hugo Chávez and apparently feels he needs to rely on them more. This is not to say Chávez didn't talk about them because of course he did--but under Maduro they are coming fast and furious and are aimed more at domestic opposition specifically rather than, say, the CIA.

And I love the end of the article, which cites Hugo Pérez Hernáiz:

But Hugo Perez, a sociology professor at the Universidad Central de Venezuela, says activists have reason to worry. When a government starts talking about opposition plots, any target "is no longer a political adversary - it is the local agent of a foreign conspiracy and therefore an absolute enemy," he said. 

For two years, Perez has run a blog devoted to tracking Chavista conspiracy theories. Lately, he's had enough material to post several times a week.

Indeed!

Luis Vicente Leon on Venezuela Sanctions

David Smilde translates Luis Vicente Leon's comments on potential Venezuela sanctions from a WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America) event. If you want a really good, concise argument about why they are a bad idea, then you've got it.

Using poll data, he shows that Venezuelans see the sanctions as an excuse for the United States to meddle and force regime change. Leon sees the sanctions stemming in large part from legitimate concerns mixed with a typical election-year gimmick in anti-Chavista Florida districts, but Venezuelans are understandably suspicious of U.S. motives.

The money quote:

Taking the individual route of Big Brother usually ends up being a Big Mistake, or as Marino Alvarado of Provea says, an own goal from midfield.

This sentiment is exactly the same as the post I wrote about President Obama's approach to foreign policy, which involves a credo of "don't do stupid shit." Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons the chances are good we will.

The Venezuelan Assassination Saga

Via Hugo Pérez Hernáiz: The Venezuela assassination* stories are reaching new levels of absurdity. The government makes accusations literally almost on a daily basis. Now one of the people they've accused has struck back, saying the government forged emails to make its case. As far as I can tell, the government has yet to respond, not even with a "the alleged forgeries are forgeries."

What I'd love to know is how these play with Venezuelans. A reasonable hypothesis is that chavistas will be more likely to believe the threats and support the government's responses (such as issuing arrest warrants) but how strong is that support? To what degree do the constant announcements start to decrease it? I would think that at a certain point even many government supporters will be lulled into a "crying wolf" attitude, especially in the context of the counter-accusations.

* in Spanish the word used is magnicidio. There is in fact an English word "magnicide," which means the murder of a prominent political figure, but I've never actually heard it used.

Is Maduro Influential on Twitter?

The Venezuelan government is lauding the fact that Nicolás Maduro has been deemed the second most influential leader on Twitter. One small problem is measurement: "influence" is defined as most retweets. With Maduro, I wonder about retweets. I've retweeted him any number of times, but almost entirely in the context of trying to figure out why he's saying something really odd. It is reasonable to believe I am not the only one. Is that the equivalent of influence?

Maduro, Assad and Foreign Policy

Bashar al-Assad's government claims he own 88.7% of votes and won the Syrian presidential election. I don't think any reasonable person could believe Syrian votes actually matter, or that Assad presides over anything other than a dictatorship. Yet Nicolás Maduro issued a statement congratulating Assad and how the vote affirms his leadership and shows how the Syrian people desire peace.

I've written before how Venezuela often seems to define its foreign policy by doing the opposite of what the United States wants, using the language of anti-imperialism. Openly praising dictators takes it just one step further.

This reminds me of how the U.S. government praised clearly venal and dictatorial governments in Latin America during the Cold War. It is really a mirror of the Venezuelan stance now. The United States government didn't really care about El Salvador or Guatemala--it cared about the Soviet Union. Similarly, the Venezuelan government doesn't care about Syria--it cares about the United States.

Praising those who deserve none is geopolitical and primarily about sending signals. In the U.S. case, it was about being firm against Marxism. In the Venezuelan case, it is about being firm against the Empire. Both deserve only scorn.

El Salvador and Petrocaribe

In El Salvador, newly inaugurated president Salvador Sánchez Cerén announced he's setting up a deal with Petrocaribe. It would entail getting $1.2 billion of oil but only paying $600 million with 1% interest over 25 years.

I've made the argument before that Nicolás Maduro would have to back off Petrocaribe given his own economic problems. So does the El Salvador deal refute that? Not quite. In 2013 Guatemala pulled out because it never got the promised preferential deal. This year Honduras said Venezuela was changing the rules as it went. The Dominican Republic is getting less oil than it was promised. The Planning Minister of Trinidad and Tobago has said publicly that Petrocaribe is too risky to be a sustainable source of energy.

So the real question is whether El Salvador will actually see that oil at that price on those terms.

Thoughts on Venezuela Sanctions

News of the House passing targeted sanctions against Venezuela as well as an open letter from some members of Congress (all Democrats) opposing them have been circulating around.

Some observations:

1. There are already targeted sanctions on Venezuela that as far as I know have had no measurable effects (thanks for Steven Bodzin for pointing out their continued existence, though he makes a different point).

2. U.S. legislators disdain Latin American organizations even while claiming to want partnership. Like it or not, the region is opposed to sanctions.

3. Final passage is likely because U.S. legislators don't care whether the sanctions will really work--they just want to look "supportive" and/or "tough." Plus, there is no cost of any kind to bear for voting in favor.

4. Approving sanctions to show moral or ethical support even when they'll likely have little to no effect is bad policy.

5. Unilateral sanctions are ineffective, even more so when they are actively opposed by everyone else.

6. Sanctions are being driven by a very small minority of Congressmembers and wealthy Venezuelan-Americans.

7. Assuming passage, President Obama will likely enact them but can pick and choose who are the "human rights abusers" in the Venezuelan government. Supporters want some big fish but it is not likely that will happen.

8. The net effect of all this will be of the "tempest in a teapot" variety.

Don't Copy Cold War Policy in Latin America

At Shadow Government Ethan Kapstein asks and then answers a question that is not well thought through. Summed up:

Q: How can the U.S. achieve its interests abroad without going to war?
A: Use the same tactics it employed during the Cold War in Latin America

By promoting land reform and industrialization in East Asia and Latin America, for example, the United States helped to create entrepreneurs and new economic interests that sought growth and political stability over peasant and proletariat revolution. 

One problem here is that the United States was vehemently opposed to the vast majority of land reform efforts in Latin America during the Cold War. Remember how it responded to land reform that affected United Fruit in Guatemala?

Similarly, President John Kennedy played an active role in America's involvement in Venezuela during the early 1960s, when that country was threatened by a communist-backed insurgency. The United States provided financial support to the regime of Romulo Betancourt for a wide range of social programs, while it backed negotiations with other elite groups -- including the military, Catholic Church, and petroleum interests -- who opposed the government's reform measures. Again, military assistance was provided to the government, but mainly in the form of technical support and training.

To be fair, yes, Kennedy supported Betancourt and the latter was good for Venezuelan democracy. But as Giglio and Rabe point out, that case was exceptional. For Kennedy and other presidents, ideology was everything and elsewhere they supported dictatorships. What Kapstein is really getting at is the Alliance for Progress, which did not last long and from the Latin American perspective was unsuccessful. As Chilean President Eduardo Frei (who received a ton of Alliance aid) wrote in 1967 in Foreign Affairs:

Many Latin American governments have used the Alliance as a bargaining lever to obtain increases in U. S. aid precisely so as to avoid changing their domestic situation. These governments have committed themselves to internal reforms which later they knowingly allowed either to become a dead letter, or worse, to be completely controlled or used for the benefit of those in power.

So this is not exactly a model we should revive and use again. What you could potentially argue is that is the United States should follow the model it used with the Alliance for Progress under Kennedy (but not LBJ) in some Latin American countries (but not all) and try to recreate the idealism instead of the concrete reality of failure.

Using Cuba in Venezuela Talks

Juan Gabriel Tokatlian argues that the United States and Cuba could work together to stabilize Venezuela.

Maybe, and just for a brief window of opportunity, there is some room for a concerted, quite diplomacy between the United States and Cuba regarding Venezuela. UNASUR, the United States and Cuba all have certain legitimate national interests at stake there and not many of them are incompatible. A combination of incentives and restraints, patience and demands, political carrots and diplomatic sticks can be designed over the medium and long term. There is not a quick fix, nor a magic bullet when dealing with the Venezuelan crisis. The core issue at this moment should be respect for human rights, the establishment of a realistic political dialogue, and the commitment of all domestic parties to democratic strengthening and against authoritarianism. [emphasis mine]

I appreciate the creativity--which the Venezuela crisis could use--but something puzzles me. Cuba does not respect human rights, has no political dialogue, and is opposed to democratization. So how can it help in promoting those things in Venezuela?

Further, economically the Cuban government is desperately dependent upon the continuation of a Chavista government so it really cannot act as a neutral arbiter in any case. Its goal will be to neutralize the opposition and prop up the government.

Repression and Talks in Venezuela

The MUD has halted talks because of government repression.

“The talks haven’t produced any result up to now,” Capriles said in an interview over a chicken stew in Barlovento, Miranda on May 10. “With the camp raids the government has shown its problem isn’t the barricades, it’s the protest itself.”

I'm not really sure how chicken stew was relevant...meanwhile, the United Nations is now criticizing the Venezuelan government for excessive use of force:

The United Nations human rights office today voiced concern at renewed violence in Venezuela, and at the reported excessive use of force by the authorities in response to protests.
...
“We unequivocally condemn all violence by all sides in Venezuela. We are particularly concerned at the reported excessive use of force by the authorities in response to protests,” said Mr. Colville.

“We therefore reiterate the High Commissioner’s call to the Government to ensure that people are not penalised for exercising their rights to peaceful assembly and to freedom of expression and for sustained and inclusive, peaceful dialogue based on Venezuela’s human rights obligations,” he said, adding that OHCHR remains available to support efforts to this end.

That came on the heels of the recent Human Rights Watch report. And concern from Amnesty International. The government and its supporters have consistently argued that the government is using restraint in the face of extremely violent protesters. That line is getting more difficult to credibly sustain.

If you look at this purely from a strategic perspective, Nicolás Maduro will likely find it difficult to convince a majority of Venezuelans that the MUD is responsible for the suspension of talks. And given Maduro's gradual approval slide, Venezuelans clearly want some convincing.

Update: Maduro blames pressure from Miami for the talks being suspended.